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in anticipation of compacts between
the States similar to that involved
in the Colorado River situation;
sixth, and finally, the organization
would design to derive the advan-
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tage of the specialist and expert
through committees on special subjects as for example "taxation."
V. A. M.

The Constitution and Dynamic Sociology
By VICTOR ARTHUR MILLER, of the Denver Bar

N pursuance of the policy of the
RECORD to afford opportunity for
discussion by the members of the
Denver Bar Association on topics controverted or otherwise, the colleagues
of the writer on the board have afforded this opportunity for the expression
of certain views of his own stimulated
by the recent celebration of Constitution Week.
It is not the function of this article
to indulge in eulogy upon the Constitution nor to attempt any instruction
or analysis upon any of the great precepts of Federal organization. Such expression, if directed to a group of
lawyers , would be a work of supererogation.
It is proposed to discuss, and that
not particularly in accordance with
any traditional treatment, the single,
greatest and most characteristic feature of the fundamental organ of our
government.
The one preeminent
principle in the American Constitution, the one consideration for which,
above all others, it is worshipped by its
friends and execrated by its enemies,
is its militant protection of individual
man.

Few would disagree with Dean
Pound that the authorship of the constitutional principle in our polity
which protects the individual is in the
alliance of the Puritan and Pioneer
with the classic economic and social
philosopher of the eighteenth Century,
the proponent. of the laissez faire doctrine. Certainly, so far as argument
can proceed in personam, no truth was

ever discovered in a h appier atmosphere than the mental background of
the three characters thus named. The
Puritan and particularly the American
Puritan, Burke's "Essence of Dissent"
was, as is agreed by all historians of
the frontier, concentrated to a selective type of an even higher order in
point of courage, brains and energy as
he pushed settlement to the West. He
was therefore the very cream of the
cream of all ancestral stock on earth
and, to his iron virtues of enterprise,
self-reliance, thrift, and endurance was
added the humanitarian thought of
the intellectual giants of a humanitarian era-blending in the authorship of
the Constitution.
Nor can the most vigorous opponent
of the individualist policy of the
American Constitution deny to it, its
external effect in times past as a beneficent, if not vitally necessary element, in developing our country and
protecting it from the tribulations of
other lands at other times. It cannot
be doubted from a historical standpoint that unrestrained power over
the individual vested in any kind of
government has through all the centuries proven to be an abysmal failure.
This is true whether the government
was an absolute monarchy or an absolute democracy an oligarchy or mob
rule. From the massacre by ballot of
the Athenian generals after the battle
of Aegospotamos through the religious
persecutions of Louis XIV and James
II, an unbridled legal authority of man
over man has resulted in governmen-
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tal oppression, robbery, and assassination and, as Macaulay has said, filled
the jails with men and women of whom
the world was not worthy. It is unnecessary to multiply facts on this historical generality, we take it that it
would be admitted to be true beyond
denial or dispute. Further, historically speaking, we believe that it would
probably be undisputed likewise that,
from an economic standpoint, the development of our own country-at any
rate to anything approaching its present proportions-would have been impossible except for the sheltering arm
of a fundamentally individualistic
form of government.
Narratively speaking, therefore, impartial history, the unanimity of belief
in individualist tenets in American
habits of thought together with support in the more obvious economic
phenomena of current existence have,
by great men past, always been regarded as ample justification for fixing
an individualistic character on the
highest law of the land and making
that character of constitutional limitation a practical protection against
oppression by any form of government
whether or not supported by a majority
of voters and whether or not backed
by immediate popular opinion and in
the teeth, if need be, of alleged social
demand.
The Constitutional view of the individualist has been epitomized by the
great Judge Mathews in defense of the
despised Chinese in the memorable
language:
"The fundamental rights to life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, considered as individual
possessions, are secured by those
maxims of constitutional law
which are the monuments showing the victorious progress of the
race in securing to men the blessings of civilization under the
reign of just and equal laws, so
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that, in the famous language of
the Massachusetts Bill of Rights,
the government of the commonwealth 'may be a government of
laws and not of men.''"
Now it was never to be doubted that
a system which professedly aims to
exact a full measure of individual
justice irrespective of the popular
viewpoint would sooner or later incur
the displeasure of some people.
It is believed that these people fall
roughly into three classes. The first
class is composed of the revolutionaries who openly oppose and desire
the subversion of the Constitution.
In the second, there are many good
citizens of an acerbic classification
who cannot be bothered with the Constitution and hence ignore it. Some of
these persons are constituted of a
simple and fortunate mental condition
of appetite untroubled by scruple.
They would not steal their neighbor's
horse because of the police, they
would not openly oppose the Constitution, because it would be an unpopular
view and too much trouble; but if
they can affiliate their lust for neighbor's horse with an alleged societary
demand, steal it safely, comfortably
and by vote they are more than well
content. Another portion of this group
entertains a sincere conscientious respect for neighbor's property in the
horse; but their mental limitations are
such that they cannot conceive him
wronged unless the horse be taken by
direct robbery vi et armis. The slightest obliquity and particularly the governmental cloak in the form of the
pillage, from a moral standpoint, alters
the whole situation with them.
Neither of these classes can be regarded as
particularly
impressive
enemies of individual rights. The former lacks volume and the latter lacks
force. But there is a third class of
opponents of the rights of the individual under the Constitution who have
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force and can muster the whole volume
of the last named contingent. They
are the professional type of intellectuals. They neither oppose nor ignore
the Constitution but compass and
imagine the evisceration of Constitutional limitations on so-called "social
grounds."
They must, therefore, be properly
recognized as the most efficient antagonists of the individualistic character
of American law.
Nor should this inherent hostility
of idea and ideal be doubted because
of a kiss they occasionally bestow upon traditional constitutional principles
as a matter of history. The school of
present abstract intelligentia
proclaims that man was made for the
state, the constitutionalist that the
state was made for man.
In a warfare of these ideas there is
no quarter. It must follow either that
our fathers were right in regarding
certain principles of right and wrong
to be eternally and universally binding
on government with only their correct
application as a proper subject for
controversy; or else so-called social
interest is the real end of government.
In the latter case the founders of the
Constitution were wrong; that document was only an historical incidentinspiring but past; and our present
form of government is inferior to those
under both British and Continental
Jurisprudence, but particularly the latter.
In view of the enormous intellectual
reputation of some of the luminaries
in the van of the societary school it
would certainly be presumptuous in
the writer of this article to venture into the lists against such Goliaths armed only with the sling shot of a simple
traditional education. He certainly entertains no purpose of such temerity.
Nearly all arguments of this phase of
governmental philosophy attempt a
comprehensive demonstration but end
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by proving nothing so conclusively as
Schopenhauer's suggestion that after
all "the intellect is only the foreign
minister of the will." In recognition
of which we point out, as regards the
pedagogic attack, that not one of its
leaders, brilliant though they are, ever
had the practical experience of measuring a dollar in terms of sweat or
risk of enterprise.
It is not to be attempted either to
convert or- refute these doctrinaires
but simply to examine their doctrines
from the standpoint of old line thought.
Since the particular societary doctrine we have under discussion is, in
its present state of exposition, found
in the expression of numbers of persons it is peculiarly adaptable from
our standpoint to inductive treatment.
We are interested in its legal and
particularly its constitutional concepts.
They appear most frequently in the
judicial opinions, magazine articles
and lectures of the judges and law professors who are its proponents. To be
understood they should be followed
through.
1. The anti-individualistic approach
to the constitutional question from
which we learn
2. The anti-individualistic expressi-on of the relation of (1) supra to
human collectivity as variously denominated "Society," "the Community,"
"the Public" and its resultant phenomena, the "State" and "Public Opinion;"
whence appears
3. The anti-individual belief as to
the nature of municipal law. On this
occasion space will permit the consideration only of the first.
Constitutionalists approach a question on the Constitution like any other
legal question of interpretation and
construction-reading it by context,
history and analogy to decided cases
through logical processes aided by traditional ethics. The societarian pro-
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ceeds from a totally different angle.
The following expressions are characteristic of Mr. Justice Holmes, the
most eminent judicial exponent of the
deconstitutionalizing doctrine under
discussion:
In one case:
"I think that the word "liberty,"
in the 14th Amendment, is perverted when it is held to prevent
the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said
that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have
been understood by the traditions
of our people and our law .....
The accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar,
or novel, and even shocking, ought
not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes
embodying them conflict with the
Constitution of the United States."
And in one of his most recent opinions:
"The constitutional requirement
of compensation when property is
taken cannot be pressed to its
grammatical extreme . . . . police
power often is used in a wide
sense to cover and, as I said, to
apologize for the general power
of the legislature to make a part
of the community uncomfortable
by a change.
I do not believe in such apologies. I think the proper course is
to recognize that a state legislature can do whatever it sees fit
to do unless it is restrained by
some express prohibition in the
Constitution of the United States
or of the State, and that Courts
should be careful not to extend
such prohibitions beyond their
obvious meaning by reading into
them conceptions of public policy

that the particular Court may
happen to entertain."
These expressions are dulcet, assured, precise and plausible. Let us
make some attempt at analysis. The
party claiming constitutional rights is
told in substance in the first statement:
1. That no law is unconstitutional if
supportable to a fair man upon the
criterion of tradition.
2. That no law is unconstitutional
though shocking to a judge from the
standpoint of tradition.
and in the latter statement
3. That no law is unconstitutional
unless it violates the letter of the Constitution.
4. That the Constitution is not to be
interpreted grammatically by letter.
If anyone regards this as a mere verbal dilemma his mind will be readily
disabused by studying its application.
Constitutional "tradition" is a veritable chameleon in the hands of a judge
determined to sustain the validity of
some guise of sovereign oppression.
If the particular eruption, however iniquitous, has any semblance of precedent, it is conclusively saved by
"tradition." If it is an outrage on all
precedent, its "shocking" novelty is
not to be permitted to weigh in the
mind of the judge. A few years ago,
in a literally ex parte civil suit, a
westerner was despoiled of several
hundred thousands of dollars of property constituting all his worldly possessions without a vestige of a hearing
in fact or theory by a hideous quirk
in the Delaware "attachment" law so
malodorous that the legislature itself
repealed it on the strength of the case.
It was judicially sustained on some
extremely ancient rules of the city of
London, i. e. "tradition."
On the other hand the rent regulations of a few years ago were an exact
logical counter-part of the Colonial
stay laws judicially damned as an ele-
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mentary fact of constitutional history
and tradition and against which the
"impairment" clause was directed by
express language and known historical
intent of the framers. These traditional considerations were as less than
nothing in the mind of the Jheringist
jurist.
Much the same may be said of the
convenience of the "express" character of constitutional limitations. As
regards either example above put,
neither the manifest lack of "due process" in ihe one case, nor the admitted
"taking of property for public use without compensation" in the other, is, it
appears, to allow enforcing the express
language to "its grammatical extreme."
Yet if it was suggested that the Delaware law was plain robbery under
forms of procedure and the other a
recognizable form of political jobbery
designed to make the state the professional foot-pad for the noisy exponents of an electorally important class
on the most elementary
-unsound
economic theory and more immoral
and unjust than petty larceny because
more cowardly, the same learned jurist
would say that no ethical or economic
view could be read into the express
language of the Constitution.
The anti-individualistic constitutional
expression in individual rights is summed up, therefore, in the old stanza
"You will if you will, you will if
you won't;
Your damned if you do, and
damned if you don't."
And so much is this true that the
brainiest lawyer in the United States
of any creed of doctrine is defied to
express a priori and in terms of legal
principles the view of the societarian
judge on any constitutional question.
He knows, to be sure, that the constitutionality of almost any act will be
sustained; but he cannot tell why in
casual language intelligible to the profession.
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Space will not permit an extended
discussion of other characteristic attributes of the collectivist approach to
the constitutional question, further
than to state that like the one last discussed they are all elaborately calculated to prevent, in the alleged inter'
est of so-called "society" a control of
judicial determination by concepts previously known.
With this view their expressions
almost invariably woo the general and
the abstract and shun the concrete.
As a corollary to this few cases are
cited and none subjected to close analysis. And indeed, in view of the other
aspects of the matter any other course
would and does lead to some surprising situations.
For instance, in the rent cases, vent
was given to the concrete comparison
that since the legislature might limit
the vertical dimension of a building it
should have the right to regulate the
rents in the building.
The astonishing conception of the
learned judge seems to be that the
sovereign interest inheres ipso facto
in the subject of height. If a sign
board is high and rents are high and
they can take down the height of the
sign board they can take down the
height of rents. In this view the first
legislator must have been Procustes.
The somewhat novel view may not
be undeserving of serious consideration. It certainly opens interesting
vistas for future legislative activity on
the subject of Snakes Hips, and
Women's Dresses.
Another characteristic of the anticonstitutional approach is the petitio
principii on a major scale. It is unfortunate that this particular characteristic cannot be developed at some
length but by way of exemplification
one may direct attention to a statement by Dean Pound in his lectures on
the Spirit of the Common Law:
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"The conception of law as a securing of interests or a protecting
of relations has all but universally superseded the individualist
theory."
The attitude of finality in this generality must leave one with a traditional education actually gasping.
As a mere fleeting instance of the
same argumentative aspect in the
same work, Judge Steven J. Field is
referred to as a leader in a "belated
individualist crusade."
This is reminiscent of nothing so
much as the modus arguendi of the
great Parliamentarian Thadeus Stevens in his references to "the late Andy
Johnson."
A last aspect of the social approach
is its preference for an adjudication
wherein the Judge as a person consciously makes and molds the law
than for one where the Court as a theoretical entity purports to find it.
Extreme' as these characterizations
appear to be it is thought that they
do not overstate the processual doctrines of the class under discussion as
appears by explicit statement in its
own expressions. We understand it
to be not only designed on the part of
the societarian but to be recognized as
designed and openly proclaimed by
teachers of that school, who look with
great complacency upon the policy as
an important prerequisite to social experiment.
In cutting loose from theories of a
preexisting state of law and avowedly,
or in effect, establishing a new law
predicated upon current judicial instinct, Dean Pound professes to sense
one of the most beneficent legal institutions of the present day which he
frankly and unblushingly designates
"Judicial Empiricism." The adjective
"empirical" is normally used in a
somewhat derogatory connotation. But

in this case It is simply another of the
numerous paradoxes we have already
encountered.
In fairness to the harbingers of social
reform it should be said that attempt
is made to substantiate the experimental character of judicial empiricism in
current practice by a number of specific instances. In fairness to the contrary view it should be said that the
probative force, from all angles, of the
incidents elucidated has yet to be subjected to analysis and attack.
Since, however, the collectivist himself does not attempt to justify upon
traditional standards, the procedural
as distinguished from the substantive
basis of his views but allows his procedure to be dictated by supposed
policies of "social interest" as its only
ground, we may perhaps in conclusion,
and without offence roughly delineate
the procedural rules of anti-individualistic adjudication as requiring that
it should, on principle, be meaningless
as precedent and cultivate judicial
know nothingism as conscious policy.
Nor is it a style to be scorned as a
forensic weapon. It has all the fighting qualities of Uncle Remus' Tar
baby. It may have to yield at every
point of concentrated attack but when
judicially announced it still can stick
and smear.
Judicial empiricism expects the
judge to "snatch a grace beyond the
reach of art" in supposed "social interest". Ancient good and economic
principles might run counter to "the
dominant opinion" as to the needs of
society and hence the judge cannot
know as law either the ten commandments or the operations of supply and
demand. A learned societarian has
jestingly remarked that he was once
likened to Pontius Pilate. But in this
at least the comparison has a semblance of merit: "He asked, "What is
Truth?", but would not stay for an
answer."

